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This article addresses some of the data protection issues at stake in cloud computing: more specifi-
cally the question of responsibility regarding personal data processing in cloud computing scenarios
from an EU perspective. How are the different schemes to be assessed in light of Directive EU/95/46?
And are the notions of data controller, data processor, and data subject, as defined in this Directive,
still useful? The conclusion of this analysis is that cloud computing scenarios have to be assessed on
an individual basis and that the protection the Directive offers to data subjects is often unsatisfactory.
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¿Quién controla la nube?
Resumen
Este artículo trata sobre algunos de los temas de protección de datos que se cuestionan en computación en
nube. Concretamente, aborda la cuestión de la responsabilidad en el tratamiento de datos personales en
situaciones de computación en nube. Aborda esta cuestión desde la perspectiva de la Unión Europea.
¿Cómo deben evaluarse modelos de computación en nube diferentes por lo que respecta a la Directiva 95/
46/CE? y ¿siguen siendo útiles los conceptos de responsable del tratamiento de datos, encargado del trata-
miento de datos e interesado o titular de los datos tal como se definen en esta Directiva? La conclusión de
este análisis es que las situaciones de computación en nube se tienen que evaluar de forma individual y que
la protección que se ofrece a los titulares de los datos o interesados en la Directiva suele ser insatisfactoria.
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Introduction  
Every so often the computing industry is shaken by a new
paradigm. In the nineteen sixties and seventies, dumb ter-
minals were connected to mainframes, and in the eighties
the PC shifted work from the mainframe to the desktop.
In the nineties, we witnessed the large scale adoption of
the Internet, which not only allowed people to shift from
their limited environment of the desktop and venture out
in the World Wide Web, but also made it possible to recon-
nect to the enterprise mainframes and IT infrastructure.
Early in the new millennium, grid computing seemed to be
the next thing, but currently this is being overshadowed
by ‘cloud computing’ (CC). This is seen by some as revolu-
tionary: “We’re moving to a new world. It’s about next
generation applications and next generation platforms”,1
while others are much more reserved: “Clouds are water
vapour. […] All it is, is a computer attached to a network.”2
Analyst firm Gartner seems to agree with the latter and
identified cloud computing as being at the “peak of
inflated expectations” and on its way to the ‘Trough of
Disillusionment’.3
Irrespective of whether CC is radically changing the com-
puting landscape, it is a fact in the lives of many employ-
ers, employees, customers and citizens. Services and
indeed entire computing platforms are transferred to ‘the
cloud’, meaning that data processing and storage loca-
tions become fuzzy: rather than data being stored in the
enterprise’s own databases or in the user’s own PC, data
in cloud environments can be anywhere on the globe. And
worse, the data may move in an instant from one country
to another for efficiency reasons: data are indeed in the
cloud. This raises numerous legal questions regarding
data protection, confidentiality, intellectual property,
etc.4 The nature of CC also questions the foundations of
data protection, based on the idea that personal data is
processed by data controllers whose location was
assumed to be known (Leenes, 2008b, p. 360). The Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC5 (DPD) aimed to set the
rules for processing personal data with (large) IT systems
of enterprises and governments in mind. The cloud model
may be at odds with this.
This article addresses some of the data protection issues
at stake in cloud computing. More specifically it addresses
the question of the responsibility regarding the process-
ing of personal data in CC scenarios. I will address this
question from an EU perspective. How are different CC
schemes to be assessed in light of the DPD? And are the
notions of data controller, data processor, and data sub-
ject as defined in this Directive still useful? 
First, there is a very brief overview of the core concepts
in the domain of CC. Next, I briefly outline the DPD, focus-
ing on the concepts of personal data, data subject, data
controller, and data processor. Then we will assess differ-
ent CC scenarios in view of these concepts. The analysis
shows that these scenarios have to be assessed on an
individual basis and that the protection offered to data
subjects by the Directive is often unsatisfactory. Conse-
quently, users of cloud services may want to resort to
contracts and service level agreements in order to miti-
gate some of the risks. Finally some conclusions and rec-
ommendations will be given.
Cloud computing
Cloud computing is hard to pin down. It encompasses a
multitude of different service and deployment models. An
established definition seems to be lacking, although the
NIST definition seems on its way to become the de facto
definition: “Cloud computing is a model for enabling con-
venient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, serv-
ers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rap-
idly provisioned and released with minimal management
effort or service provider interaction.” (Meil and Grance,
2009). For our purposes, only a few aspects need high-
1. Salesforce’s Marc Benioff, see: http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/salesforces-benioff-clouds-arent-in-a-box/39488
2. Oracle’s Larry Ellison, at the same conference where Benioff lauded Cloud Computing. For his entire speech, see: http://venture-
beat.com/2009/10/01/larry-ellisons-annual-cloud-computing-smackdown/
3. See: http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/gartner_hype_cycle_2010_cloud_computing_at_the_pea.php
4. For an overview of legal issues see, for instance Catteddu and Hogben, 2009 and Van Gyseghem et al., 2010
5. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 24 October 1995, on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, O.J. L 281, 23 November 1995.
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lighting. The most important is the fact that the provider’s
computing resources are pooled to serve multiple con-
sumers using a multi-tenant model. 
The different physical and virtual resources are dynami-
cally assigned and reassigned according to consumer
demand. The customer generally has no control over or
knowledge of the exact location of the resources provided,
but may be able to specify location at a higher level (e.g.,
country, state, or data centre) (Meil and Grance, 2009).
Cloud services concern resources such as storage,
processing, memory, network bandwidth, and virtual
machines. Generally three types of services are distin-
guished: cloud software (SaaS), cloud platform (PaaS),
and cloud infrastructure (IaaS). In the case of SaaS, the
consumer uses an application provided by the cloud pro-
vider. Well known examples are Google Docs, Microsoft’s
Hotmail and Dropbox. In the case of PaaS, the cloud serv-
ice provider has a platform for application or service
development on which customers can build their own
application or service. An example is Vtravelled, a travel
service developed by Virgin Atlantic running on the Ama-
zon AWS platform.6 Finally, IaaS allows customers to run
any software, including operating systems and applica-
tions on the service provider’s equipment. Regarding
deployment models, a distinction is made in infrastruc-
tures operated for a single organisation (private cloud),
cloud infrastructures shared by several organizations and
supporting a specific community that has shared con-
cerns (community cloud), public infrastructures and
hybrid clouds. Obviously, customers have more control in
private clouds than in public clouds which, by their nature,
have to have general terms and conditions.
Here, some simple examples guide the analysis. The cases
differ as to whether they concern public or private clouds,
the location of processing and data storage, and the
extent to which the end-user has control over the service
offered. I limit the analysis to SaaS cases, because these
already illustrate the intricacies of regulation of the dif-
ferent actors and services offered. The first example con-
cerns Eleni Primero, a student at Tilburg University, which
has recently decided to use the Microsoft Live@Edu7 envi-
ronment for their students. In this case, the service is pro-
vided by servers hosted within the EU (Amsterdam, with a
backup in Ireland).8 This is an example of a private SaaS.
The second case concerns the author using Google Docs
and other Google Apps to collaborate with partners in a
European project. This is an example of a public SaaS.
Google cannot specify the location of the servers for this
particular case. 
The third case concerns Tim Third, who has a Facebook
profile hosted by a public SaaS, most likely located in the
USA. 
Within each CC scheme we can distinguish different enti-
ties:
• The service provider (CCS), which is the natural or
legal person providing the service (SaaS, IaaS, or PaaS)
in a CC system.
• The subscriber/customer. The natural or legal person
contracting the CCS. The subscriber can be an individ-
ual, such as Tim Third, or an organisation, such as
Tilburg University.
• The (end-)user. The natural person who actually uses
the CCS in a specific context. The user may coincide
with the subscriber, as in Tim Third’s case, but may
also be someone else. Eleni Primero is the end-user of
the mail service contracted from Microsoft by Tilburg
University.
These entities can be mapped to concepts in the DPD.
The Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC
The DPD, enacted in 1995, aims to facilitate the free flow
of information while maintaining an acceptable level of
6. See http://www.vtravelled.com
7. http://www.microsoft.com/liveatedu/free-email-accounts.aspx?locale=en-US&country=US
8. This was an important factor for Tilburg University to opt for Microsoft rather than a competing offer by Google, which could not
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privacy for individuals.9 It tries to strike a balance
between competing interests. On the one hand there is a
clear privacy interest of the individual, while on the
other, there are freedom of expression and commercial
interests in providing services for which personal data
are essential. The obligations for the parties involved in
the processing of personal data have to be seen in view
of these two, potentially conflicting, aims of the direc-
tive.
The DPD lays out a number of basic privacy principles
that need to be guaranteed when personal data is col-
lected or processed by what are called 'data controllers'.
A central concept in the Directive is personal data, which,
according to article 2 (a) means any information relating
to an identified or identifiable person (data subject).
‘Identifiable’ is every person “who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an iden-
tification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, mental, economic, cultural or social identity". In
consumer-business relations, directly identifying data,
such as name, and indirectly identifying data, such as tel-
ephone or other numbers, (e.g., customer numbers and
social security numbers) are relevant. 
We have to assess whether the data involved in CCS sce-
narios is personal data in view of the DPD. This is the easy
question. In many cases, personal data will be processed.
All three scenarios outlined in the previous section
involve large amounts of personal data.10 Email addresses
(of both sender and recipient) and any content that refers
to identifiable people are personal data, but so is, gener-
ally, the IP addresses of the equipment used in the vari-
ous settings and the cookies set by the providers.11
Data subjects in CC schemes can either be the user whose
personal data (such as account information, IP addresses,
cookies, e-mail addresses, preferences, use patterns,
attributes) are processed, but also others who are men-
tioned, or referred to, in particular content such as com-
ments or tags on social network sites, or images
portraying identifiable individuals.12
Article 2 (b) of the DPD states that processing of personal
data “shall mean any operation or set of operations which
is performed upon personal data, whether or not by auto-
matic means, such as collection, recording, organization,
storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or other-
wise making available, alignment or combination, block-
ing, erasure or destruction.” Once again, it is not difficult
to see that many CCS process personal data.
Data Controller
More difficult are the concepts of ‘data controller’ and
‘data processor’. According to article 2 (d) of the Direc-
tive, controller applies to “the natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or
jointly with others determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data; where the purposes and
means of processing are determined by national or Com-
munity laws or regulations, the controller or the specific
criteria for his nomination may be designated by national
or Community law”. In article e, the processor is defined
as the entity that “processes personal data on behalf of
the controller”.
Which entity has to be qualified as data controller is rele-
vant for two reasons. First, it determines whether or not
the Directive is applicable in a particular case (applicable
law), and second it determines who has certain responsi-
bilities and obligations (allocation of responsibility).
The applicability of the DPD is determined in article 4 of
the Directive, which states:
“(1) Each Member State shall apply the national provisions it
adopts pursuant to this Directive to the processing of personal
data where:
a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of
an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Mem-
ber State; when the same controller is established on the terri-
tory of several Member States, he must take the necessary
measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies
with the obligations laid down by the national law applicable;
9. DPD 9 preamble article 3.
10. See also Catteddu and Hogben, 2009.
11. See, for instance, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2007; Leenes, 2008a
12. See, for instance, Kuczerawy, 2010; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2009
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b) the controller is not established on the Member State's terri-
tory, but in a place where its national law applies by virtue of
international public law;
c) the controller is not established on Community territory and,
for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equip-
ment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the
said Member State, unless such equipment is used only for pur-
poses of transit through the territory of the Community.
(2) In the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 (c), the con-
troller must designate a representative established in the terri-
tory of that Member State, without prejudice to legal actions
which could be initiated against the controller himself.”
This provision distinguishes between controllers physi-
cally (1a) or legally (1b) located in an EU member state, or,
if located outside the EU, those making use of equipment
for purposes of processing personal data except when
solely transmitting data from Community territory to a
third country, which excludes routers etc. (1c). 
In the days before the Internet, this provided sufficient
guidance. Usually, the equipment used for processing per-
sonal data (mainframe, minicomputer, or PC) was at the
location of the entity responsible for the processing (e.g.,
a hospital or a company headquarters) in which case the
controller could be easily determined. But this is less sim-
ple today, as illustrated in the cloud scenarios. Tilburg
University uses Microsoft services. Microsoft has its main
headquarters in Redmond USA, but also has offices in
many other countries. Their cloud computing facilities are
also in different countries, possibly at the same locations
as their offices, but more likely in other data centres. In
more complex cloud scenarios, third parties are involved
in the service environment. For instance, in the Facebook
case, there are advertisement aggregators involved, as
well as providers of applications that run within the Face-
book environment.
In other words, the location where decisions are taken
concerning ”the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data” does not have to coincide with the location
where the actual processing takes place, and there may
be multiple entities involved in taking decisions regarding
different purposes, meaning that there may be multiple
controllers (and processors) in the different cloud com-
puting scenarios. 
What determines who the controller is: the location of the
legal entity responsible for deciding on ‘purposes and
means’ of the processing of personal data, or the location
of the actual processing? If the legal entity is decisive,
then in the Eleni Primero case, it does not matter where
the data of the Tilburg students is stored, as long as their
contracting party is located in the EU (which is the case:
Microsoft Netherlands), the students’ data is protected
under the EU DPD. However, if the location of the
processing is decisive, then it may matter where the data
is processed and stored.13
The Enisa report on cloud computing benefits and risk
(Catteddu and Hogben, 2009, p.100) concludes, on the
basis of article 4 of the DPD, that the place where the
controller is established is relevant to the applicability of
the DPD,14 and that the place of processing of personal
data and the residence of the data subject are irrelevant
in this respect. 
This corresponds to the Article 29 Data Protection Work-
ing Party (WP) opinion on applicable law (WP 56) (Article
29 Data Protection Working Party, 2002, p. 6), which
states that the “directive uses the criterion or ‘connection
factor’ of the ‘place of establishment of the controller’ or,
in other words, the country of origin principle typically
applied in the Internal Market.”
Furthermore, “the place, at which a controller is estab-
lished, implies the effective and real exercise of activity
through stable arrangements and has to be determined in
conformity with the case law of the Court of Justice of
the European Communities. According to the Court, the
concept of establishment involves the actual pursuit of an
activity through a fixed establishment for an indefinite
period.15 This requirement is also fulfilled where a com-
13. I do not include the applicability of foreign (non EU) law. For instance, if the data is stored on US territory, the USA Patriot Act
applies, which has far-reaching consequences. Content that is permissible under EU law may not be permissible in the US, mean-
ing that EU citizens might run a risk when their data is stored in the US.
14. See also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2002, p. 6, which states that the “directive uses the criterion or ‘connection
factor’ of the ‘place of establishment of the controller’ or, in other words, the country of origin principle typically applied in the
Internal Market.”
15. Case C-221/89 Factortame [1991] ECR I-3905 §20
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pany is constituted for a given period.” To make clear that
the Working Party do not mix up legal entity with location
of the technology it adds: “The place of establishment of
a company providing services via an Internet web site is
not the place, at which the technology supporting its web
site is located or the place at which its web site is accessi-
ble, but the place where it pursues its activity”.16 
Opinion WP 169 (Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, 2010) adds “being a controller is primarily the con-
sequence of the factual circumstance that an entity has
chosen to process personal data for its own purposes” (p.
8). In this Opinion, a distinction is made between control
stemming from explicit legal competence (e.g., appoint-
ment by national law), implicit competence (e.g.,
employer in relation to data on employees), and control
stemming from factual influence (facts of the case). The
latter category seems most relevant in cases of CCS. 
Using the place of establishment of the controller as the
decisive criterion, instead of place of processing, does
make sense. The decision on what to process and for
what purpose affects data subjects the most. That the
actual processing of these data, in order to provide a
particular service at a certain moment in time, might be
done more efficiently or effectively at location X,
whereas moving all data to location Y does not really
matter for the data subject. Or does it? As the data con-
troller has a responsibility to provide adequate security
measures, the actual location of processing and storage
does affect the data subject, but arguably to a lesser
extent under normal conditions.
However, this is not the end of the story. 
In the case where the controller is situated outside EU
territory, the ‘country of origin’ connection factor does
not determine which legislation is applicable. In this case,
as stated in Article 4, 1 (c) of the Directive, the location of
the processing equipment is what counts. In other words,
if the controller residing outside the EU makes use of
equipment for the processing of personal data situated
within a Member State, then the DPD still applies and it is
the Member State’s legislation that governs the data
processing.
Establishing that a CCS processes personal data and
decides on the purposes and means of the processing of
personal data is, even in cases of entities not residing in
EU territory, often not that difficult. Facebook, with its
headquarters in Palo Alto, California, determines what
data to collect from its users. Google, also in California,
determines what personal data to process in the case of
Google Apps, and Gmail. But do these CCS providers make
use of equipment in an EU member state if an individual
on EU territory uses their services? What is the require-
ment to make the DPD applicable to their operations in
the EU? It depends. As stated in Article 4, 1 (c), the equip-
ment has to be used for the processing of personal data,
mere transmission tools are excluded. 
If the user solely uses a browser to enter data into forms
on web pages provided by these controllers, the answer
is no, they are not using equipment in an EU member
state. The user’s PC is then only used for transmission,
just like routers, switches and cables. But this changes
when these CCS providers make use of cookies, JavaS-
cript, Flash code, etc. For instance, in WP 56 (2002, p.
10-11), the Article 29 Working Party argue that “the
user’s PC is equipment in the sense of Art. 4 paragraph 1
lit. c Directive 95/46/EC. It is located on the territory of
a Member State. The controller decided to use this
equipment for the purpose of processing personal data,
[…]. The controller disposes over the user’s equipment
and this equipment is not used only for purposes of tran-
sit through Community territory. The Working Party is
therefore of the opinion that the national law of the
Member State where this user’s personal computer is
located applies to the question under what conditions
his personal data may be collected by placing cookies on
his hard disk.”17 
The last sentence sounds like an oxymoron – collecting
data by writing data on the user’s PC, but the cookie is in
fact used by the service provider to recognize the user and
be able to link his behaviour over time. But still, equating
16. Directive 2000/31/EC, Recital 19
17. This opinion has been confirmed in the Art. 29 WP Opinion on search engines (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2008)
and the Art. 29 WP Opinion on Social Network Sites (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2009).
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cookies with equipment seems far fetched. This may be a
language issue;18 earlier versions of the Directive used the
term ‘means’, which is closer to what cookies are than
equipment which relates to tools and devices.
Cookies raise a more important issue, however. As already
mentioned, if the CCS did not use cookies in their services
(nor JavaScript, etc) then they would be exempt from the
DPD, whereas if cookies are used, the CCS fall under the
scope of the DPD. Aleksandra Kuczerawy (2010, p. 80-82)
provides an interesting analysis of this with regard to social
network sites. Article 5 (3) of the Directive on privacy and
electronic communications 2002/58/EC states that serv-
ice providers may only store information or gain access to
information stored in the terminal equipment of a sub-
scriber or user on condition that the subscriber or user
concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive infor-
mation, in accordance with the DPD, inter alia about the
purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to
refuse such processing by the data controller.
This provision is meant to protect European citizens. Par-
adoxically, if a user in the EU chooses to block cookies,
the protection provided on the basis of Article 4, 1 (c) of
the DPD is no longer applicable. 
If a CCS provider located outside EU territory serving cus-
tomers within the EU has to be qualified as data controller
(for instance, because it uses cookies), then it has to com-
ply with the data protection regulation of each of the
member states served.19 
Household exception
The DPD contains another condition for applicability of
the Directive: the household exception articulated in Arti-
cle 3 paragraph 2: “This Directive shall not apply to the
processing of personal data by a natural person in the
course of a purely personal or household activity.” This
condition is relevant in the light of cloud services used by
individuals, and particularly in the case of individuals
using social networking sites. 
In the Lindqvist-case20 in 2003, the European Court of
Justice decided that: “The act of referring, on an inter-
net page, to various persons and identifying them by
name or by other means, for instance by giving their tel-
ephone number or information regarding their working
conditions and hobbies, constitutes the processing of
personal data” and that “Such processing of personal
data is not covered by any of the exceptions in Article
3(2) of Directive 95/46.”
The Article 29 Working Party, in line with the Lindqvist
case, hold the opinion that when users make data availa-
ble to a high number of third party, possibly unknown,
contacts, it may mean that the household exemption does
not apply, and the user could be considered a data con-
troller. If the user acts on behalf of a company or associa-
tion, the household exception does not hold.
Consequences
Defining the exact roles of the parties involved is impor-
tant because it determines the responsibilities of these
parties regarding the processing of personal data. Appli-
cability of the EU data protection regulation means,
among other things:
• The controller has to clearly define the purpose of the
processing as one of the requirements to make the
collection of personal data fair and lawful (Art. 6
DPD);
• The controller has to ensure that the data are ade-
quate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the
purpose for which they are collected (Art. 6 DPD);
• The collection must be based on legitimate grounds
(unambiguous consent, performance of a contract,
compliance with a legal obligation, in pursuance of
legitimate interests of the controller etc.) (Art. 7 DPD);
• The data subject has the right of access to and the rec-
tification or erasure of their personal data (Art. 12
DPD);
• The data subject has at least to be informed about the
identity of the controller and representative if any, the
18. See footnote 22 in WP 56.
19. Which has been termed an ‘impossible burden’ (Kuner, 2007).
20. C 101/01 (2003) 
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purpose of the collection, the recipients and about
their rights (Art. 10 DPD);
• The controller must implement appropriate technical
and organisational measures to protect personal data
against accidental or unlawful destruction or acciden-
tal loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure or access,
in particular where the processing involves the trans-
mission of data over a network, and against all other
unlawful forms of processing. (Art. 17 DPD).
Who controls the cloud?
Let us now return to the CC scenarios outlined earlier to
qualify the different actors in relation to the concepts dis-
cussed in the previous section.
It turns out that in many CCS scenarios there is a plurality
of controllers and processors that have either joint or
sequential control. The same entity may be controller for
one purpose of data processing and a processor for other
purposes. The subscriber may be data controller, data
processor, or data subject. The end-user may be a mere
data subject, but in some cases the end-user may also be
qualified as data controller.  
In Eleni Primero’s case, for instance, Microsoft is a data
controller (as they process her account data, and also if
they use her data for other purposes), but Tilburg Univer-
sity can also be qualified as data controller because they
place Eleni in Microsoft’s ‘hands’. In the processing for
which Tilburg University can be considered the data con-
troller, Microsoft acts as processor. 
In Tim Third’s case, Facebook is a data controller, but if Tim
makes information about identifiable individuals available
to a sufficiently large audience, he is controller for this
information too. If the information is only visible to his
small group of friends, the household exception applies to
his actions. The author of this article may be a data control-
ler if he processes personal data, provided that he chooses
purposes and means. The household exception does not
apply here, because he operates on behalf of his employer.
If his employer, Tilburg University, determines that he has
to use Google Apps for specific purposes involving per-
sonal data, for instance grading papers uploaded to Google
Apps, then Tilburg University may be the data controller
and Google merely the processor.
What these examples show is that a very diffuse land-
scape may arise in CCS scenarios, despite the fact that
the Directive aims to ensure that, “even in complex data
processing environments, where different controllers
play a role in processing personal data, compliance with
data protection rules and responsibilities for possible
breach of these rules are clearly allocated, in order to
avoid that the protection of personal data is reduced or
that a ‘negative conflict of competence’ and loopholes
arise whereby some obligations or rights stemming from
the Directive are not ensured by any of the parties.” (Arti-
cle 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2010, p. 22). 
I am not so sure that responsibilities can be clearly allo-
cated. In many (public) CCS scenarios where users have
accounts, cookies and inline scripts are used, the service
incorporates third party functionality (e.g. applications
provided on Facebook) and services (e.g. adverts served
by a third party) and the user discloses information about
third parties, the complexity may be significant and enti-
ties will (try to) shift their responsibilities to others. 
But even if responsibility can be clearly allocated, what is
the practical significance? Does it lead to an adequate
level of protection of EU citizens? What does it mean if
the end-user is qualified as a data controller? How, for
instance, is the end-user to comply with the security
measures imposed by Article 17 of the DPD in such a
case? Or how can he comply with the purpose limitation
requirement imposed by Article 6? 
How much control does an end-user have in situations
where ‘take it or leave it’ regimes exist, as is commonly
the case in public cloud services. End-users have a very
weak bargaining position against large CCS providers
such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft.21
Subscribers, certainly in the case of legal persons, can
try to negotiate terms that allow them to comply with
21. And even the Article 29 Working Party seems to have only limited influence on organisations such as Google and Facebook judg-
ing from the lax adoption of WP 29 recommendations.
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their own obligations, but even here there is a power
imbalance between the (usually large) cloud providers
and weaker customers (see for instance Catteddu and
Hogben, 2009, p. 97-98).
The predominant question is whether cloud computing,
with its plurality of involved entities and the fluidity of
data and processing, marks a clear need to reconsider
the core concepts and roles in the Data Protection Direc-
tive? Does the ‘territoriality’ of data protection rules
have to be defined differently depending on the duties
(e.g. security or transparency) and the actors (data con-
troller or data processor) at stake, and if so, how (Poul-
let et al., 2010, in press)?
Conclusion
In this paper, I have provided a glimpse of the basic data
protection issues surrounding cloud computing. The clear
cut distinction between data controllers and their helpers,
the processors, on one hand and the data subjects on the
other, is no longer an adequate model of personal data
processing. Nor is the idea that data is processed for a
single, or limited set of purposes. Data that is disclosed to
friends is also used for targeted advertising, tailoring
services etc. This makes the link between purposes and
controllers opaque, even though, in theory at least, the
links can be articulated. Territoriality of controllers also
loses its significance when data moves from data centre
to data centre and, most of the time, this is not important
from the perspective of privacy protection. What matters
is who decides what happens with data. The current way
of bringing non-EU entities under EU jurisdiction (the
cookie-equipment route) seems to me to be a way of
bypassing the problem rather than a proper way to make
non-EU data controllers responsible for their actions.
Finally, I think phenomena such as web 2.0 and cloud
computing make clear that the whole concept of personal
data and what we purport to facilitate and protect
requires reflection: and this is precisely what the Commis-
sion is currently doing in the revision of the DPD.
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